On China
China is a major international trading partner, a major market for the world. The question is, will it rival the United States as a great power around the world?聽
How would you describe China鈥檚 geopolitical position at the moment? China鈥檚 borders are secure, and in East Asia it鈥檚 quickly displacing the United States as a hegemonic power. So China is quite the success story. Outside East Asia, China has a long way to go to become a global power. Yes, it鈥檚 a major international trading partner, a major market for the world. The question is, will China rival the United States as a great power around the world? I think that, beyond East Asia, it鈥檚 going to be simply a global presence, not a global power.
What does it mean to be a global presence? If you think of the United States after World War II, if a poor country needed a bridge built, it went to the United States. Today, it鈥檚 more likely to look to China. If you have an emergency or a humanitarian crisis, maybe China will be there first to help out. China has become the 鈥済o-to country鈥 of the 21st century.聽China wants to take its place in the global system as a leader. And certainly it has the resources to do that. So it鈥檚 an image issue, it鈥檚 a drive for status. The Chinese are proud of what they have accomplished, and they want to compete with the United States and assume the leadership role of the United States.
How does this role benefit China? China wants other countries to take into account Chinese power. It also wants the United States to worry. It wants the U.S. to disperse its resources, to be concerned about the Mediterranean or the Middle East or the Western Pacific. Finally, there鈥檚 a lot of national pride in the notion that China is indeed a humanitarian state in, say, the Middle East. Chinese global leadership can help the Chinese Communist Party achieve legitimacy and support from the Chinese people.
Why is it important for the party to have the supportof the people in a country that鈥檚 not a democracy? Make no mistake, leadership in China鈥攁 single-party, authoritarian country鈥攊s always concerned about instability and thus maintaining support from its people. So we see the crackdown domestically, the greater restraints on freedom of speech, on newspapers, on television. They wouldn鈥檛 be doing this if they weren鈥檛 nervous. And when China is perceived by the people to be doing well, the Chinese Communist Party does well.
What do you make of speculation that China and Russia are forging closer political ties as a bulwark against the West? Certainly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has transformed Europe and America鈥檚 role in Europe. However, I think the expectation that you will see closer Chinese-Russian relations and the emergence of blocs is misplaced. Consider the sanctions on Russia. If you look at the American demands on China, the consensus seems to be, We don鈥檛 expect China to follow our sanctions, but we expect it not to undermine them. And so far, the Chinese have done that. Also, the Chinese aren鈥檛 necessarily pleased with Putin鈥檚 actions. They gave him a royal welcome to Beijing during the Olympics and said, 鈥淲e have your back, no limits to our friendship.鈥 And then he goes off and he invades Ukraine, dragging the Chinese into a conflict with Europe and the United States. They can鈥檛 be happy. Now, over the longer term, China鈥檚 the big beneficiary of the war. First, the United States has been trying聽to pivot its attention to East Asia since 2010. And everytime we try, we get drawn back into the Middle East鈥擨raq, Syria, Afghanistan鈥攁nd now we鈥檙e getting drawn back into Europe. So how can we reallocate resources and attention to Asia when we鈥檙e getting bogged down in Europe? Second, with their military decimated in Ukraine, the Russians will be increasingly dependent on China in the years ahead. And these sanctions are going to make China a more important economic lifeline for Russia. As Russia gets weaker every day, Russia needs China more and more.
China and India each maintain a strategic relationship with Russia, yet the world鈥檚 two most populous nations are probably best described as rivals.聽Americans often misunderstand India鈥檚 strategic alignments. The Indians buy weapons from Russia, but the Russians are no help for Indian strategic interests. Russia cannot help India with Pakistan. It can鈥檛 help India on the border with China. And it can鈥檛 help India deal with the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean. There鈥檚 only one country that can do all of that: the United States. So beneath the surface, U.S.-India relations are getting better each year. The Indians have a long commitment to nonaligment, so they鈥檙e not going to be overtly American, but look聽beneath the surface and you see India beginning to cooperate more with the United States, simply because of the growth of China.
How does this relationship further American interests? This is America鈥檚 containment policy. We are collaborating with India, Australia, Japan, and many smaller countries on the perimeter of East Asia to contain the Chinese navy inside East Asia. The Chinese see this very clearly and they aren鈥檛 happy. They accuse the United States of wanting to create a new East Asian NATO, directed at China. But, for the most part, China is also quite content with its growing military influence in East Asia. They鈥檙e mostly content with the direction of their security.
Do you see any countries right now that are in the position China was thirty or forty years ago and that someday could become a superpower? Many Americans think a rising India might help us with China, but the problem is that the gap between India and China鈥攊n GDP, in technology, in naval power鈥攇rows every day. So India is actually declining relative to China. And Japan can鈥檛 help us. It has a population of 120 million and a stagnant economy and little growth. Brazil is not going anywhere very quickly. So the future is a U.S.-China world. When people say, Can we get help in dealing with China? the answer is, No. If America wants to contain China, it鈥檚 going to have to do it by itself.聽
Robert S. Ross is a political science professor. A member of the Council on Foreign Relations, he specializes in research on Chinese security policy and defense policy, East Asian security, and U.S.-China relations.